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Abstract
We develop and compute a dynamic equilibrium model
where economies difier on the relative e–ciency of flnancial
intermediaries and, therefore on households portfolios and
currency holdings. Our model economies have some of the
features of the difierent flnancial structures in countries of
the European Union and respond to monetary shocks in a
way similar to the observed responses, which we also esti-
mate. It follows that, if difierences on the relative e–ciency
of flnancial intermediaries persist in a monetary union, con-
°icts of interests in the pursuit of a common monetary policy
can arise.
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Non Technical Abstract
In spite of the high level of economic and flnancial integration in
Europe in the last ten years, there are still marked difierences across
countries regarding: (1) e–ciency of the banking sector; (2) portfolios
holdings and flrms’ flnancing, and (3) output and price responses to
monetary shocks. This paper develops an equilibrium model with limited
participation, which is consistent with these three facts.
In the paper, we study two economies (which can be identifled with
France and Germany) difiering for the degree of e–ciency of the banking
sector (fact 1). As a result, agents in the two countries hold difierent
portfolios and flrms are flnanced with a difierent mix of debt and equity
(fact 2). When we calibrate the model for the two economies, impulse
responses to a monetary shock difier in a way similar to the observed
impulse responses for France and Germany (fact 3).
We then study the efiect of integrating these two economies in a
Monetary Union. We flnd that, when countries are in a monetary union,
and to the extent that the difierences in the flnancial systems persist
(likely to happen in the flrst stage of EMU), endogenous preferences for
monetary policy may be even more diverse than when countries are sepa-
rated. In particular, the same monetary policy gives rise to redistribution
efiects not present if countries were more isolated.
Finally, we estimate VAR for France and Germany over the period
1973-1997 and we show that the output responses to monetary shocks
are very similar to the theoretical reactions derived from our model and
similar to other existing result.
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1 Introduction
The transmission mechanism of monetary policy may be deflned as the
ways in which monetary impulses from the central bank afiect output
and prices. Changes in monetary policy are transmitted to the real econ-
omy through various channels, each of them can consist of several stages.
Hence, national transmission mechanisms are likely to be difierent: dif-
ferent channels may be at work in difierent countries and the intensity
by which a monetary impulse is transmitted can vary, even substantially.
But difierences in national monetary transmission processes between Eu-
ropean countries, in turn, are likely to afiect the magnitude and timing
of the price and output efiects of alternative monetary policies of the
European Central Bank (ECB). They may also have implications for
the scope and nature of policy coordination in the current state and for
evaluating possible beneflts of joining a monetary union for individual
countries. Hence, even in the absence of cyclical divergences and dif-
ferences in policy preferences across countries, the stance of monetary
policy to be followed by the ECB can be a source of con°icts between
member states of EU. This, in turn, may imply a decrease of support for
the monetary policy of the ECB1.
In what follows, we do not enter the debate on the relative impor-
tance of the difierent channels of transmission of monetary policy. We
believe that monetary policy afiects output and prices (at least in the
short to medium run) and may do so through difierent channels, not
mutually exclusive, simultaneously at work and likely to reinforce each
other. Our aim is to focus on the fact that a certain (common) monetary
stance may have difierent macroeconomic consequences from one coun-
try to another. While the existing literature has mainly analyzed partial
equilibrium models emphasizing speciflc channels or, when approaching
the issue in a general equilibrium framework, has concentrated on liquid-
ity efiects, we show that the difierences in the speed and magnitude of
1For instance, the ERM crises of 1992-93 highlighted cross-country di®erences in
the monetary transmission mechanism which seemed to substantially a®ect the cost
of maintaining the parities.
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a monetary impulse into economic activity depend on difierences in the
flnancial structure, on difierent role of flnancial institutions and on difier-
ent portfolios composition of households and flrms in difierent countries
as well as on difierent liquidity constraints. In this framework, when (or
if) a common monetary policy is implemented (and to the extent that
the efiects of it are difierent for difierent countries) unwanted distortions
and/or con°icts may arise.
An empirical (statistical) examination of the role of banks, stock
markets and portfolios compositions of the European economies suggests
that they difier signiflcantly in many ways. First of all, in some European
countries (e.g. UK) markets for privately issued debt and stock markets
are highly developed, so that bank credits are (almost) perfect substitutes
for bonds, while in others (e.g. Italy and Germany) these markets are
less developed and bank credit and loans cannot be seen as substitute
sources of flnancing. This can substantially afiect the liquidity of markets
and the ways in which a money injection (or reduction) is translated
into households and flrms. There are also difierences in regulations, in
procedures, in the relative use of short term versus long term flnancing,
in the relative share of flxed versus °oating rates, in the degree and
composition of indebtedness of flrms, households and governments. Also,
the flnancial structure of the difierent countries has evolved difierently in
the last two decades, with changes in the competitiveness of the banks
and growth of non bank flnancial intermediaries in some countries but
not in others, with difierent evolution of stock markets and changes in
the composition of assets and liabilities of households and flrms. At the
same time, mainly in the last decade, capital markets have become more
integrated and some EU countries (e.g. France and Italy) have been
compelled to lift previously operating administrative controls.
There are, of course, some areas where convergence is likely at the
outset of a Monetary Union. First of all, the convergence of in°ation
rates should lead to a more uniform pattern of short-term versus long
term flnancing across countries, at least to the extent that these dif-
ferences have emerged as a result of difierent in°ation records; also the
increased competition across flnancial intermediaries should imply that
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the pass-through of changes in market rates to lending rates should be-
come more similar. We maintain that some structural difierences will
stay; the transmission of monetary impulses to the real activity and the
distribution of gains and losses amongst EMU members is likely to de-
pend on these difierences.2
Our aim is to capture some of the existing difierences in the fl-
nancial structure and portfolios compositions of European countries in
an equilibrium model where economies difier for the relative e–ciency
of the flnancial intermediaries (i.e. households portfolios and currency
holdings) and to study the implications of a common monetary policy
for difierent economies under two difierent regimes: with and without a
Monetary Union. We flnd that the same monetary policy gives rise to
redistribution efiects, not present when countries are isolated.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some stylized
"facts" emphasizing the heterogeneity of flnancial markets in 4 big Euro-
pean countries: Germany, France, Italy and the UK. Section 3 outlines a
simple dynamic equilibrium model which allows to account for (at least
some of) the detected difierences and analyze the consequences for the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. It is an overlapping gen-
eration model with cash in advance constraints. A monetary expansion
induces a decrease of the interest rate and an expansion of output through
a substitution of consumption of cash and credit goods and revisions of
plans about deposits and assets holding. The difierent e–ciency of the
banking system implies difierent liquidity constraints across countries, so
that the degree of substitution and therefore the real efiects are difierent.
Contrary to most G.E. models, using this framework, we get persistence
of an independent shock. Section 4 calculates the theoretical impulse
responses for an interest rate shock, under difierent scenarios (autharkic
countries, Monetary Union, the same and difierent cash/deposit ratios).
Our model economies, which we call for convenience France and Ger-
many, have some features of the true flnancial structure of France and
2Of course di®erences exist also within the national borders. They tend, however,
to be smaller, since between countries there are more di®erences in regulations and
institutions.
4
Germany and respond to shocks in a way similar to the observed response.
Section 5 presents some VAR estimates of the efiect of an interest rate
shock on output of France and Germany over the 1973-97 period and
Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains the description of the data
set and unit root tests on the variables used in the VAR estimation.
2 The heterogeneity of European flnancial
markets: Some stylized "facts"
Despite the implementation of the single market from 1992, despite all
the changes brought about by deregulation, capital liberalization and
technological innovation in the last two decades, the flnancial systems of
European countries are still characterized by a high degree of heterogene-
ity. Furthermore, their convergence over time has been quite limited and
some of the fundamental difierences existing in the 1980s have survived
all the changes. In the following we point out two related difierences in
the flnancial markets of France, Germany, Italy and the UK3, which we
believe can afiect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and
therefore induce con°icts in the monetary policy decisions of the Euro-
pean Central Bank: the degree of development of flnancial markets and
portfolio decisions of households, flrms and institutional investors.
2.1 The degree of development of flnancial markets:
There are two main channels through which funds °ow from savers to ulti-
mate borrowers within each economy. Savers can invest directly, through
the purchases of securities such as stocks or bonds issued by a non flnan-
cial corporation (direct flnance) or their °ow of savings can be interme-
3While here we concentrate on these four countries, Gennari and Giovannetti, 1998
provides data on the ¯nancial structures, liquidity constraints and portfolio choices
for 15 EU countries. It must be noticed that, in Europe, there is also a signi¯cant
heterogeneity regards the links between the central banks and the ¯nancial sector, cf.
Giovannetti and Marimon, 1995.
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diated by flnancial flrms (indirect flnance). Direct flnance takes place in
capital markets. The prevalence or absence of flnancial intermediation in
a national economy structures the relationships within the private sector.
European countries are very difierent with respect to the mix of
direct and indirect flnance that characterizes their flnancial systems. Ac-
cording to European Economy (1997) "This is mostly explained by the
relative role of domestic banking: countries with high flnancial interme-
diation equally show a high degree of banking intermediation" (p.10). As
shown in Table 1, Germany is characterized by a much higher degree of fl-
nancial intermediation (more than 50%) and bank intermediation (above
80%) than any other European country. Because of the dominant role
of bank intermediation, many flnancing demands which could be met by
bonds or equities are provided by bank loans. Accordingly (or because
of) the most e–cient banking sector amongst European countries -no
matter what criteria is used to assess e–ciency4 is in Germany. The ex-
isting data, not fully harmonized and therefore to be used with caution,
show that classical banking intermediation (i.e. taking deposits from con-
sumers and making loans to people and flrms) is still the main channel of
saving and investment in all EU countries. However, there are relevant
difierences in the use of loans versus shares, which re°ects difierences in
market capitalization. In Germany, security markets are underdeveloped
with respect to other major EU countries (namely France and the UK,
see Table 1). In1995, stock capitalization represented only 29% of GDP
in Germany versus almost 150% of GDP in the UK (it was 39% in France,
and 22% in Italy, see again table 1). The number of flrms quoted in the
stock market is much larger in the UK and in France (both in terms of
consistency and new quotations) than in Germany and Italy and new
issues are particularly low in Germany5. As a result, equities issues by
4Di®erent crietria can be applied to assess the e±ciency of the banking sector.
Gual and Neven (1993) suggest to evaluate the sta® costs per deposit, which give
information on the cost side of intermediation, or the net interest income per deposti,
which also allows to account for possible lack of competition.
5In Germany the capital market was fragmented into eight independent regional
stock exchanges till fairly recently and this can at least partially explain the di®erences
in the degree of stock market capitalization. Also, German banks conduct both direct
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flrms are a signiflcant share of GDP in the UK and France (respectively
65 and 70% in 1994) but almost irrelevant in Germany (25% in 1994)6.
It must be also noted that most European stock markets mainly trade
domestic equity and that flnancial integration has not changed this type
of segmentation. Only in London foreign shares are usually traded (2/3
of total trading in London is foreign shares, which amounts to around
95% of total EU trading in foreign shares).
Table 1 here
2.2 Portfolio decisions
The difierent mix of direct and indirect flnance re°ects in portfolio de-
cisions of the private sector. Even though, as far as households are con-
cerned, the share of deposits over gross assets has fallen everywhere in
the last twenty years (table 2), the extent of the fall is very difierent: in
Germany deposits were 59% of gross assets in 1980 and still constitute
45% of households flnancial assets in 1994, while, for instance in France
they dropped from 59% to 32% and in Italy from 58% to 29% (households
savings has been fairly stable in this period, despite cyclical °uctuations).
While bonds have remained fairly constant between 1980 and 1994 (see
Table 2), direct securities holding have been in general declining (France
represents an exception). Transactions costs in securities markets (in-
cluding the bid-ask spread) makes it di–cult for households of average
means to diversify via direct securities holdings especially because liquid-
ity is low in the case of direct holdings. Hence a feature of UK, Germany
and Italy has been that the share of households portfolios held in the
form of securities has tended to decline (table 2) while the proportion of
equities and bonds held via institutions has tended to increase (see again
and indirect ¯nance and have therefore made the capital markets largely endogenous
to the banking system. To the extent that industries have access to the securities
market, their access has been governed by banks.
6There also seems to be a correlation in the 4 European countries between equity
market capitalization and the size of ¯nancial institutions, but a discussion of this
issue is outside the scope of this paper. Cf. Davis, 1996.
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table 2). Only in France direct holding of securities passed from 14%
in 1980 to 32% in 1994 (possibly because of a successful privatization
process), with institutional investors also increasing their weight (from
7% to 29%). This seems to indicate that in France households tend to di-
rectly supply funds to the ultimate borrower even if this means to bypass
the flnancial sector.
Table 2 here
As far as non-flnancial flrms are concerned, there has been an over-
all increase in flnancial liabilities in the last two decades which has been
covered with difierent mix of debt and equities. The existing data (OECD
flnancial accounts statistics) show particularly large difierences in the use
of loans versus shares (see Table 3). Loan flnancing is particularly high
in Germany and substantially lower in France and the UK (when consid-
ering loans as proportion of gross flnancial assets, respectively (50%, 28%
and 12%). Hence, the role played by German banks in lending to non-
flnancial corporations is substantially bigger7. Furthermore, over time,
the loan ratio declined substantially in the UK and remained fairly con-
stant in other European countries. The equity ratio, on the other hand,
has risen everywhere except in Germany, reaching the remarkable value
of 70% in France and 65% in the UK, while staying at a mere 25% in
Germany.
Table 3 here
Structure of equity holdings, however, has tended to move away
from the household sector and towards institutional investors everywhere
apart from France, where, as we said, households hold directly substan-
tial shares of equities (see Table 4). In Germany, for instance, flnancial
institutions own 30% of the total amount outstanding (14% are directly
owned by banks and the remaining 16% by other flnancial institutions)8.
Table 4 here
7In 1991 more than 60% of bank loans were provided in a long term form in
Germany, while the same ¯gure was around 50% for the UK, cf. OECD Non-Financial
Entrerprises Financial Statements, 1991.
8Many bank customers, furthermore, keep their shares deposited with banks and
allow banks to exercise voting proxies on their behalf.
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2.3 Monetary aggregates
Per capita currency holding (expressed in common currency, i.e. dollars)
difiers substantially amongst European countries despite similar levels of
development9. Germany has a much higher flgure than other European
countries (with the exception of Switzerland), possibly because of the
large holdings of DM abroad. Theoretically, the currency holding should
decrease over time as a result of flnancial innovation and use of electronic
money, but in Germany if anything, currency holding has increased.
Composition of monetary aggregates also varies substantially in
Europe. For instance, the ratio of cash to the difierent measures of
money supply (respectively, M1, M2 and M3) is higher in Germany10
(see Table 6) than in the other countries.
Also, o–cial reserves are lower in France and the technical features
of the reserve requirements difier signiflcantly across countries, re°ecting
functional and structural difierences between national flnancial systems.
The main difierences are re°ected in the deflnition of bank liabilities (type
and currency), the rates applied, and the existence and level of remuner-
ation. In Germany for instance, a 5% reserve requirement is levied on
sight deposits and 2% on other types of deposits, without remuneration.
In France, the ratio is 1% on sight deposits, and 0,5% on other types
of deposits, also not remunerated. In Germany, the required reserves in
1994 were 1.3% of GDP and in France only 0.1%. This is likely to afiect
the costs of the intermediation.
Table 5 here
These difierent characteristics of the flnancial systems obviously
9The presumption is that per capita currency holdings di®ers with di®erent level
of developments. In particular, less developed countries have a lower average level of
currency holding, also because of unstable environment. However, the big di®erences
existing between countries with similar levels cannot be explained merely by reference
to di®ering payment habits and rates of in°ation.
10It must, however, be noted that Eastern European countries use DM (and no
other European currency) and this can impart a bias on the total amount of cash, cf.
Seitz, 1995. Overall, Seitz concludes that roughly 40% of the German money supply
is held abroad.
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re°ect in empirical analysis of the transmission mechanism, but do not
translate in clear-cut conclusions about the likely impact of a monetary
shock. At the empirical level, in fact, the difierent characteristics of
a country in terms of flnancial structure can have ofi-setting efiects11.
At the theoretical level, the work on the transmission mechanism has
mainly focussed on limited participation models (see for all, Christiano
et Al, 1997), without emphasizing the possibility of difierent flnancial
structures.
Having in mind that the mix of direct and indirect flnance is very
difierent in the four major European countries, that the ratio cash to
monetary aggregates also varies substantially, we propose a limited par-
ticipation model where we allow for difierent ways of saving and flrms’
flnancing (which is the endogenous result of difierent e–ciency of the
flnancial sector across countries). This is the object of the next section.
3 A model with flnancial diversity
We develop a model that tries to incorporate some of the features that, as
we have done in the previous section, can be identifled as potential sources
of diversity {and con°ict{ in the way that the Transmission Mechanism
may work in the early stages of the EMU. The model is an Overlapping
Generations Model with Cash-in-advance features. The OLG structure
allows for alternative savings decisions. In particular, agents live for three
periods, receive an endowment in their two initial periods and consume
in their last two periods. They can diversify their portfolios between
outside money (cash), bank deposits and equity, in the form of asset
holdings of an underlying technology, that {after two periods{ realizes a
positive real return. There is no uncertainty and Cash-in-advance con-
straints guarantee that the {return dominated{ outside money is being
held by households. Nevertheless, economies may difier in the extent that
11For instance, sluggish adjustment of bank lending rates can protect ¯rms from
shocks but banks can ration credit (non price rationing) and amplify the e®ects of a
shock.
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goods must be purchased with cash. Agents can get a positive return on
their savings by either making deposits in flnancial intermediaries or di-
rectly holding the two-period asset. Whether they directly hold assets
depends on the relative e–ciency of the banking system, another feature
that will difierentiate our economies. However, even with relatively inef-
flcient banking systems, agents will typically use flnancial intermediaries
to obtain one-period returns.
The flnancial intermediaries, resembling the behavior of banks, ac-
cept funds from households and return them to the household in the form
of interest and principal payment. Financial intermediaries use their de-
posits (and, possibly, monetary injections) to purchase two-period assets
(as if they were lending to flrms). Given that they are inflnitely-lived in-
stitutions they can provide households with one-period returns at a cost.
Given that there is perfect competition in the sector, flnancial interme-
diaries’ returns correspond to the outside asset return net of operating
costs. Banks account for indirect channels of supply of funds; the stock
market on the other hand, is an example of a direct channel, since it lets
households to directly purchase assets. As in most developed economies,
central monetary authorities deal primarily (uniquely, in our model) with
flnancial intermediaries and, therefore, new money enters the economy
by an injection from the monetary authority into the flnancial interme-
diaries. Government bonds and open market operations can easily be
incorporated in our model but, for simplicity, we do not include bonds
and we limit our analysis to the case an exogenous injection (subtraction)
of cash to (from) flnancial intermediaries.
With respect to the stylized facts previously discussed, our model
economies could represent, broadly speaking, France (and the UK) and
Germany (and Italy). As we have seen in Section 2, in the former house-
hold directly hold assets (shares) and, in general, they do not channel
a large part of their saving into deposits. In the latter, on the other
hand, indirect channels are the norm. Households loan to the flnancial
intermediaries their money and get in exchange a return.
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3.1 Goods, assets, households and flnancial inter-
mediaries
There is a continuum of consumption goods, exogenous endowments, and
a real asset giving a return of R2 after two periods12. Consumption goods
only difier in the form on how they can be purchased. In fact, real assets
and endowments can be {without costs and linearly- transformed into
consumption goods, independently of their type. One can think of our
economies as having goods in difierent locations where some locations
(e.g. street vendors) only accept cash while others are willing to sell for
what, efiectively is, credit (e.g. stores that accept debit cards, checks or
other forms of credit). In terms of consumption, however, the agent is
indifierent on where the good is being purchased. An agent of generation
t (born in period t¡ 1) only values consumption in the last two periods
of his life. That is, household’s preferences are represented by
U(c1t) + flU(c2t) (1)
where c1t is {the average{ consumption in the intermediate period of his
life and c2t of his last period. The utility from cash and credit goods is
given by:
U(c) =
Z °
0
u(ci)di+
Z
1
°
u(ci)di (2)
where ° is the parameter indicating how goods can be purchased13.
Goods in the range (location) [0; °] can only be purchased with cash
while goods in the range [°; 1] can also be purchased with credit14.
12
R
2 denotes the real return net of transactions costs. These can be di®erent for
¯nancial intermediaries and for individual agents, as well as they can di®er across
di®erent economies.
13We make the standard concavity and di®erentiability assumptions. That is, u0 >
0; u00 < 0:
14As we have said, ° is one of the parameters that will di®erentiate our economies.
It should be noticed that this formulation allows for a simple characterization of a
richer transactions technology, by making ° endogenous (e.g. a function of e®ort
and society's technology). Here, however, we consider ° an exogenous technological
12
In period t ¡ 1 an agent of generation t has the following budget
constraint:
M1t +D1t + pt¡1at • pt¡1!0 (3)
where !0 is the flrst period’s (average, i.e.,!0 =
R
1
0
!0idi)
15 endowment.
Its value is allocated in a portfolio of cash, M1t ‚ 0, nominal deposits in
flnancial intermediaries, D1t, and holdings of the real asset, at ‚ 0. In
the intermediate period of his life, the agent faces the following budget
and cash-in-advance constraints:
M2t +D2t + pt
Z 1
0
c1t •M1t +D1tIt + pt!1 (4)
M1t ‚ pt
Z °
0
c1t (5)
where It is the nominal return on (positive) deposits. Notice that we
already imbedded in these deflnitions the fact that all goods face the same
prices, as well as the fact that the agent has no interest in purchasing
two-period assets in the intermediate period of his life. Finally, in the
last period of his life, the agent faces constraints
pt+1
Z 1
0
c2t •M2t +D2tIt+1 + pt+1atR
2 (6)
Agents can also borrow from flnancial intermediaries. However, an agent
borrowing from a flnancial intermediary faces a higher interest rate. Such
spread corresponds to flnancial intermediaries costs, which are discussed
below. In the class of equilibria that we study agents do not borrow.
Notice that generations overlap for two periods. When generation t-1
decides how much to consume of respectively cash and credit goods (i.e.
how to allocate the endowment !1), generation t gets an endowment !0
and decides how much to deposit and how much to invest in real assets.
parameter.
15For simplicty of exposition, we will denote integrals simply as
R
1
0
! from now on.
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3.1.1 Financial intermediaries
In the model flnancial intermediaries accept loans from households, which
are repaid at the end of each period at a market interest rate, and pur-
chase assets. Alternatively, the purchase of assets can be viewed as loans
to private flrms that pay back {after two periods{ a real return. Finan-
cial intermediaries also receive new cash injections from the monetary
authority16. The balance of flnancial intermediaries, in absence of money
injections, can be written as:
Dt+1 = pta
b
t+1 (7)
where abt+1 denotes assets in the hands of banks, dt+1 =
Dt+1
pt
denotes
deposits in real terms and Dt = D1;t + D2;t¡1; i.e. total deposits in
period t ¡ 1 are given by the sum of generation t flrst period deposits
and generation t¡ 1deposits in their intermediate period.
We consider the following flnancial intermediation technology. First,
flnancial intermediaries can obtain a two-period return (R + µ1)
2 from
(borrowing to) private flrms. µ1 ‚ 0 denotes the technological advantage
of flnancial intermediaries with respect to households. Second, flnancial
intermediaries can transform a two-period asset into a one-period asset,
with return (R+µ1) at a real cost µ2+µ3, where µ2 corresponds to the cost
of making the asset more liquid and µ3 to the cost of handling the one
period asset. In other words, the flnancial intermediation technology gen-
erates one-period assets with a real return (R¡µ), where µ = µ2+µ3¡µ1,
from the existing two-period assets. The relative e–ciency of difierent
flnancial communities will be represented by difierences in µ. The cash
°ow of flnancial intermediaries (CF) can, therefore, be written as:
CFt = pta
b
tR¡ pta
b
t+1 +Dt+1 ¡DtIt ¡ pta
b
tµ (8)
16
For simplicity we do not include government bonds into ¯nancial intermediaries'
balance sheets. This can be done without any di±culty (the standard non-arbitrage
conditions will equate the returns of di®erent assets in circualtion) and will allow for
government's open market operations.
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Since there is free entry in the flnancial intermediation sector, the zero
proflt condition implies that:
abt(R¡ µ) =
Dt
pt¡1
pt¡1
pt
It · dtR
d
t
i.e., Rdt = R¡µ, where R
d
t is the one-period real return on (real) deposits.
As we said, households can borrow from flnancial intermediaries,
signing one-period debt contracts. In such a case, they will face the
nominal rate It + …tµ3. We assume that µ1 ‚ µ2 which guarantees that,
even when µ < 0, households will not borrow to flnance the purchase of
assets, since Rdt +µ3 = R+µ1¡µ2 ‚ R; the last inequality following from
our assumption.
3.1.2 Monetary policy
We consider a very simple class of monetary policies. At the begin-
ning of the initial period 0 agents of generation 0 are endowed with
per-capita money holdings of M1 and agents of generation ¡1 with per-
capita money holdings of M2. Money supply is constant thereafter, al-
though we will consider the experiment of unexpectedly increasing (de-
creasing) the money supply by Xt+1 in period t. This is done through
flnancial intermediaries. In such a case, their consolidated balance sheet
is Dt+1 + Xt+1 = pta
b
t+1. That is, flnancial intermediaries can purchase
(or sell) assets with the proceeds (the claims) of the Central Bank and
return, the following period, (Dt+1 +Xt+1)It+1 to depositors. To main-
tain the deterministic nature of our model we will only consider \once
and for all surprises."
3.1.3 The initial period
Notice that in our economies there is not enough to characterize the ini-
tial distribution on money holdings, we must also characterize the initial
distribution of assets and deposits. We assume that at the beginning of
the initial period agents of generation 0 have real claims in flnancial in-
termediaries of d1;0 giving them a real return d1;0R
d
0. Similarly, agents of
15
generation ¡1 start period 0 endowed with assets a
¡1and deposits d2;¡1,
giving them returns a
¡1R
2and d2;¡1R
d
0, respectively. Finally, flnancial
intermediaries start period 0 endowed with ab
¡1assets and satisfy their
commitments on initial deposits d0 = d1;0 + d2;¡1. As we will see, sta-
tionary equilibria can be easily characterized; however, their existence
requires an appropriate initial distribution of assets and deposits. For
example, we will consider economies where a
¡1 = 0 and economies where
d2;¡1 = 0. Alternatively, it can be shown that, given an initial distri-
bution of assets and deposits, the economy converges to a stationary
equilibrium from period one on.
3.2 Monetary equilibria in a closed economy
A monetary equilibrium is achieved, for a given initial distribution
(M1 ;M2; d1;0; d2;¡1; a¡1; a
b
¡1), when there are prices (p0;f…t; Itg
1
t=1), such
that (i) flnancial intermediaries choose asset holdings and supply de-
posits, fabt ; Dtg that maximize proflts, under a free-entry condition;(ii)
households choose consumptions and portfolios fc1;t; ~c1;t; c2;t; ~c2;t;
M1;t;M2;t; D1;t; D2;t; atg
17 that maximize their utility subject to their
budget, and cash-in-advance, constraints and, flnally, (iii) all markets
clear. In particular, feasibility in the goods market requires that:
°c1;t+(1¡°)~c1;t+°c2;t¡1+(1¡°)~c2;t¡1+at+1+a
b
t+1 = !0+!1+at¡1R
2+abtR
d
t
(9)
In order to characterize equilibria, notice that from the flrst order
condition of the households maximization problem we obtain difierent
solutions depending on whether assets returns dominate deposits or vice-
versa because depending on the sign of µ agents will decide to directly
purchase assets (if µ > 0), in which case they will not hold second period
deposits (i.e., D2;t = 0), or they will put all their savings into flnan-
cial intermediaries (i.e., at = 0 if µ > 0). To distinguish among these
17Since consumers decide to consume the same quantities of all the cash goods of one
period, and similarly for credit goods, we denote by c1;t the generation t consumtion
of cash-goods in their interemediate period and ~c1;t the consumption of credit goods
for the same period, etc.
16
economies, we will denote by economy A, an economy where Assets re-
turns dominate deposits and by an economy B one where consumers
prefer Banks to the stock market as a way to channel their savings.
In an economy of type A (µA > 0), we get the standard condition
equating the marginal rate of substitution between cash and credit goods
(of period one) to the nominal interest rate (the cost of assigning part of
the portfolio to an intermediary is the lost liquidity of not holding cash
and the gain is the interest that can be used for future purchases):
u0(c1;t)
u0(~c1;t)
= Idt (10)
where, from now on, ~c denotes a credit good and c a cash good. However,
for period 2 we get:
u0(c2;t)
u0(~c2;t)
= Idt+1
•
R
R¡ µ
‚2
(11)
On the other hand, in an economy of type B (µB • 0), we get the standard
condition for both periods:
u0(ck;t)
u0(~ck;t)
= Idt¡1+k; k=1,2 (12)
We obtain the following intertemporal Euler equations, respectively for
economy B and economy A:
u0(~c1;t) > flu
0(~c2;t)R
d
t+1 (13)
u0(~c1;t) > flu
0(~c2;t)R
2(Rdt )
¡1 (14)
Furthermore, as we have seen, competition in the flnancial intermediation
sector implies that Rdt = R¡ µ:
To simplify the analysis, we consider the case of a log utility: u(c) =
log(c):With a logarithmic utility function demands take a simple form.
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Let W = !0+!1(R¡µ)
¡1
(1+¯)
, then in economy A generation t has the following
demands
c1;t = WA…
¡1
t ; ~c1;t = (R¡ µA)WA; c2;t = fl(R¡ µA)WA…
¡1
t+1
~c2;t = flR
2WA; d1;t = !0 ¡ [(1¡ °A)fl + °A]WA; d2;t = 0;
at = (1¡ °A)flWA; m1t = °AWA and m2t = °Afl(R¡ µA)WA
Substituting for consumptions, assets and deposits expressed in the
feasibility constraint (9) we obtain an equation in one variable, namely
the in°ation rate:
M(…¡1t ¡ 1) = 0 (15)
where MA = °AWA[1 + fl(R¡ µA)]: Notice that for µA 2 (0; R); (15) has
a solution …t = 1, for t ‚ 1, showing that there is a unique monetary
equilibrium which is stationary from period one on.
Similarly, for economy B we obtain the following demands
c1;t = WB…
¡1
t ; ~c1;t = (R¡ µB)WB; c2;t = fl(R¡ µB)WB…
¡1
t+1;
~c2;t = fl(R¡ µB)
2WB; d1;t = !0 ¡ °BWB; d2;t = (1¡ °B)fl(R¡ µB)WB
at = 0; m1t = °BWB and m2t = °Bfl(R¡ µB)WB
and (15) also characterizes the equilibrium in°ation rate, …¤t = 1, t ‚ 1:
3.3 Open economies with segmented flnancial sec-
tors
If an economy A and an economy B have a common market, but flnancial
disparities are maintained and -consistently with the well known \home
bias puzzle"- consumers tend to use their home flnancial institutions,
then the situation is similar of that of two independent closed economies.
To see this, consider a °exible exchange regime within the countries and
that the cash-in-advance constraints must be satisfled with the domestic
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currency. Furthermore, assume that, in spite of the single market, there
is a cost µ4 from operating across borders, such that µB + µ4 > µA (and
flnancial intermediaries maintain the same domestic cost structure with
no arbitrage opportunities). Then, as long as …¡1
Bn
< (R¡ µA) and …
¡1
An
<
(R¡ µB) , n = t; t+1, generation t demands are as in the close economy
case and monetary equilibrium in°ation rates are solutions to
MA(…
¡1
At
¡ 1) +MB(…
¡1
Bt
¡ 1) = 0
In particular, the stationary solution is …At = …Bt = 1 deflnes a monetary
equilibrium for the °exible exchange regime. Notice, however, that there
is a continuum of equilibria given by
…¡1
At
¡ 1
…¡1
Bt
¡ 1
= ¡
MB
MA
satisfying the above restrictions on asset return dominance. These solu-
tions, however, involve a trade imbalance, and a corresponding perma-
nent devaluation of one of the currencies. We will focus in the stationary
equilibrium that parallels the closed economies case.
3.4 Monetary Union equilibria (with segmented fl-
nancial sectors)
We flnally consider the case in which countries A and B form a monetary
union, but \national," or \regional," disparities persist. That is, \trans-
national" (or \trans-regional") flnancial transactions are subject to the
cost µ4. We can also consider that, even if all consumers in the mone-
tary union can satisfy their cash-in-advance constraints with the common
currency, there may still persist difierences regarding the range of goods
that can be purchased with credit; that is, °A and °B may difier. As in
the °exible exchange regime with segmented flnancial markets, demands
are as in the closed economies case. In particular, monetary equilibrium
in°ation rates for the MU are solutions to
[MA +MB](…
¡1
t
¡ 1) = 0
19
As in the case were both countries are separate, stationary output
will difier across countries even if they have the same underlying (as-
set) technologies, endowments and preferences, but they maintain their
difierences regarding the e–ciency of the flnancial intermediation sector.
4 Unexpected monetary shocks
We now consider a monetary expansion [contraction] taking the form of
a once-and-for-all monetary injection [absorption] Xt+1 in period t. We
consider flrst the case of independent countries (which also characterizes
the stationary equilibrium of the common market with °exible exchange
rates) and then the case of a monetary union. As it is well known, the
efiects of monetary policies (in models of limited participation and in
real economies) depend on the \when and how" monetary interventions
take place. By a monetary injection in period t we mean a unexpected
monetary intervention that takes place after period t decisions have been
made. In our model, the monetary injection is done through the flnancial
intermediaries, which have the following consolidated balance sheet
Dt+1 +Xt+1 = pta
b
t+1
That is, flnancial intermediaries purchase [sell] assets (make loans) and
the proceeds are paid back to the depositors who {on aggregate- receive a
return (Dt+1+Xt+1)I: The efiects of an identical monetary shock will be
difierent depending on the type of flnancial structure; i.e., whether the
economy is a type A economy, a type B economy or a monetary union
(of a country of type A and a country of type B). In particular, we are
interested in how prices (i.e., nominal interest) and portfolio allocations
change and the efiect of these changes on consumption and output. We
can distinguish three types of efiects: (i) an income efiect (due to the
fact that only people holding deposits get a share of the shock); (ii) an
efiect through difierent portfolio choices, and (iii) a pure liquidity efiect
(due to difierent °0s).
20
In a closed economy the equilibrium condition in period t is
M(…¡1t ¡ 1) +
Xt+1
pt
= 0
which implies that
…t = 1 +
zt
M
where zt =
Xt+1
pt¡1
. If Xt+1 > 0, i.e. if we consider a monetary expan-
sion, then there will be a contraction of cash goods in period t afiecting
generations t¡1 and t. In economy A; generation t+1, the only one hold-
ing deposits, revises its decisions knowing that will be getting a higher
(lower) return from their deposits than the one originally foreseen. Let
~c
0
1;t+1 be the variation on the consumption of credit goods (i.e.,
0 denote
variations). we have that generation t+ 1 shares the extra returns from
his deposits, d1;t+1, xt+1(R¡ µA); as follows:
~c
0
1;t+1 = xt+1
R¡ µA
(1¡ °A + fl)
; m
0
2;t+1 = flxt+1
R¡ µA
(1¡ °A + fl)
and d
0
2;t = fl(1¡ °A)xt+1
R¡ µA
(1¡ °A + fl)
Notice that after a monetary shock, an agent of generation t + 1 would
like to change his portfolio, but, in economy A, the assets, at, are not
liquid and, therefore, the agent must deposit or borrow from the bank (a
less attractive intermediation technology). When he saves (i.e. xt+1 > 0)
this results in ~c
0
2;t+1 = fl(R ¡ µA)d
0
2;t, while when he borrows in ~c
0
2;t+1 =
fl(R¡ µA + µ3)d
0
2;t. These costs of readjusting the portfolio are a crucial
distinct feature of economy A:
If instead the economy that experiences the Xt+1shock is of type B
, both generations, t and t+1, holding deposits, will change their credit-
goods consumption. Let fi =
di;t+1
dt+1
be the share of deposits corresponding
to generation t+1. Then, ~c
0
2;t = (1¡fi)xt+1(R¡µB) and generation t+1
will revise their consumption plans as in economy A (except that they
only receive xt+1(R¡µB)). The difierence, however, is that since in econ-
omy B; d
0
2;t > 0, and agents always want to have positive consumption of
credit goods, d2;t+ d
0
2;t > 0: That is, there is no borrowing from flnancial
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intermediaries following a monetary contraction in economy B. In other
words, in economy B the adjustments, following a monetary shock, are
less costly than in economy A (agents use the same intermediation tech-
nology with the same returns as when they where making consumption
plans in their initial period).
The adjustments of generation t + 1, however, result in an excess
supply (demand) in the goods market in period t+1 (due to m
0
2;t+1 6= 0),
resulting in a variation of prices given by
…t+1 =
•
1 +
fl°A
1¡ °A + fl
xt+1
MA
(R¡ µA)
‚
¡1
in economy A and, similarly, in economy B
…t+1 =
•
1 +
fl°B
1¡ °B + fl
fixt+1
MB
(R¡ µB)
‚
¡1
If both countries form a monetary union but flnancial structures
remain the same and households use their countries’ flnancial intermedi-
aries, households will adjust their portfolios in the same manner as they
do when countries are separate. There is, of course, an important difier-
ence in that there is a unique price reaction for both countries. That is,
with a shock Xt+1, in°ations in period t and t+ 1 are, respectively,
…t = 1 +
zt
MA +MB
and
…t+1 =
•
1 +
µ
fl°A
1¡ °A + fl
(R¡ µA) +
fifl°B
1¡ °B + fl
(R¡ µB)
¶
xt+1
MA +MB
‚
¡1
Notice that if countries are of the same (endowment) size, the country
with a larger ° will absorb most of the shock in consumption, which will
result in a redistributive efiect in period t (and t+ 1).
4.1 The quantitative efiect of a money shock in our
economies
The real efiects of monetary shock can be quite difierent depending on
the type of flnancial structure that a country has or wether countries are
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integrated in an heterogeneous monetary union or not. Even if our aim
is not to exactly mimic observed economies, the parameters underlying
flgures have been chosen as to approximate Economy A with France and
Economy B with Germany (see Table 6)18.
Table 6 here
Figure 1a illustrates the efiects of a monetary contraction on output
(and Figure 1b for consumption) when economies A and B are indepen-
dent (the shock is in period 6). As it can be seen, the efiect on output is
higher and slightly more persistent for economy A than for economy B.
In other words, the economy (Germany) with a higher cash/deposit ratio
and indirect flnance prevailing over direct access to the market (µA>µB);
because of lower transaction costs and higher e–ciency, is partially pro-
tected from the efiects of a monetary restriction. Figure 2a, reproduces
the same experiment for a Monetary Union (and a shock twice the size).
As in the closed economies case, at the time of the shock, aggregate
output does not change, but there are important redistribution efiects
between countries due to difierent cash/deposit ratios, output of econ-
omy B is increased at the time of the shock, indicating that in relative
terms economy B is better ofi. In the next period, however, aggregate
output decreases and also output of economy B drops, even though still
less than output of country A. This pattern can explain, at least to a
certain extent, difierences in preferences for a tighter monetary policy
for countries of a B type (in relative terms economy B is better ofi with
monetary tightening and worst ofi with monetary expansion).
In order to isolate the efiect of large difierences in the cash/deposit
ratio we replicate the same exercise with the same ° for both coun-
tries. In other words, we concentrate on income and assets efiects. If we
take again autarchic countries we see that, as in the case with difierent
cash/deposit ratios, in economy A the output efiect is larger (Figure 3).
18The two main di®erences are in the degree of e±ciency of the banking sector -
approximated in our calibration by the parameter µ; substantially higher in Germany
than in France (the banking sector has a higher technological advantage with respect
to households and the transaction costs are lower, Cf also Rodriguez, 1998)- and in
the cash holding of domestic currency, i.e the parameter °;again higher for Germany.
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When we consider the monetary union case, there is no redistribution
of consumption, but there are still output difierences (Figure 4). Here
total output decreases but less than it would had been for an economy A
in isolation. In other words, endogenous preferences for monetary policy
may be diverse.
Figure 1b and 2b show the behavior of total consumptions, it in-
creases at the time of a monetary contraction (as expected) because of
cash in advance constraints, to decrease in the subsequent periods. Total
consumption of economy A is more volatile, than that of economy B,
when economies are independent, but less volatile when countries joint
a monetary union. This is due to difierences in ° (with equal ° the pe-
riod t reaction is the same in both countries and, as in flgures 1b-2b, the
-negative- efiect is more persistent in economy A).
Finally, flgure 5 shows how prices (i.e., gross in°ation …) react to a
monetary contraction, when countries are independent or in a monetary
union. As it can be seen, our model does not predict a \price puzzle",
as it has been observed in some European economies (see, for example,
Sims, 1992). Following a monetary contraction prices fall (the \puzzle"
being that it seems to flrst increase), to then experience a small increase,
before returning to their stationary level.
5 The calculated VAR for France and Ger-
many
The issue of empirical testing the existence of possible difierences in the
impact of monetary policy on output and prices in European countries
is not easy and far from having a deflnite answer (see Dornbusch et Al,
1998). The case for asymmetric impact of a monetary shock is easy
to make, since, as we have documented in Section 2, there are marked
cross-country difierences in the flnancial structure (e.g. mix of direct
and indirect flnance, share of flxed and variable rate contracts, degree
of indebtedness etc.). But difierences in the flnancial structure do not
translate easily into clear-cut results and, in any case, they prompt forces
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which are likely to ofiset each other (see Gennari and Giovannetti, 1998
for a discussion). Furthermore, EMU represents a change in regime, di–-
cult to account for properly (we are back to \Lucas’s critique"). Against
this background, many studies have tried to identify cross-country dif-
ferences in monetary policy transmission19, at least in the current set-up
(i.e. before the start of EMU), but no consensus seem to exist on the
extent or nature of possible difierences. More precisely, it seems that
very difierent results can be obtained for the same country using difier-
ent models and that the ranking of the strength of a common monetary
shock on output is not consistent across difierent studies.
In what follows, we do not enter into the debate of what is the
best way to estimate the efiect of a common monetary shock in difierent
countries (see BIS, 1995) nor what is the best identifying scheme, even
though we are aware of the possibility of getting difierent results when
using difierent methods or identiflcation schemes. Our aim is simply to
see whether the implications of our theoretical model are consistent with
the actual response of output to monetary shocks - i.e.e that difierences
in the e–ciency of the flnancial structure and banking system afiect-
ing consumers’ portfolio choices and flrms’ flnancing re°ect in difierent
output response to interest rates shocks, higher in the country with the
least e–cient banking system. To this aim, we estimated VAR, which
have the advantage of avoiding the need for a complete speciflcation of a
structural model20. In principle, to evaluate correctly the efiects of mon-
etary policy, we should solve an identiflcation problem: policy actions
which are endogenous responses to current developments in the economy
must in fact be separated from exogenous policy actions. Only when the
19Di®erent methods have been used to this purpose: national and multi-country
econometric models, structural VAR with their impulse response function, single
equation models among others. Cf. Britton and Whitley, 1997 for a comprehen-
sive survey; Dornbusch et al, 1998, and Ramaswamy and Sloeck, 1997 for estimation
on groups of countries.
20There is an extens literature on pro and cons of VAR to study the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy well summarized in Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans,
1998. Also there are problems related to the so-called price puzzle, pointed out by
Sims, 1992 and suggestions to include import price to avoid it and so on (see also
Bagliano e Favero, 1997).
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latter are identifled, the dynamic analysis of the VAR system can give
reliable information on the monetary transmission mechanism. In the
following, we use the Choleski decomposition21 for a parsimonious VAR
speciflcation which includes 3 endogenous variables: output ( industrial
production), prices, and interest rates. We estimate the model over the
period 1973-9722 for France and Germany and here we only report the
impulse response functions23, i.e. the responses of output, prices and
interest rates to unexpected shocks to interest rates.
All our variables are non-stationary (see Table 7): output (indus-
trial production24) seems to be integrated of order 1 both in levels and
logarithms, while CPI is I(2) (i.e. in°ation is I(1)). Hence, we used
in°ation in our VAR estimates.
Table 7 here
For both countries, the VARs are specifled with 2 lags; in our pre-
ferred speciflcation, we add a trend, a set of orthogonal seasonal dummies
21In a 3 variable system this means that the last variable in°uences the ¯rst two,
without feedbacks from them and the second variable in°uences the ¯rst without
feedbacks from it.
22Data are described in the Appendix. Unit root tests are done using PCGive.
Estimations are done using the package E-views, version 2.0 and PCFIML. The period
corresponds to the longest available with fairly homogeneous data. We have also
reduced the period of estimation to consider only the ERM period (1979-97) and
results do not change. The same applies when exogenous variables are added to the
estimates, such as exchange rate developments, raw material prices etc. or dummies
to account for the 1992 ERM crisis and the 1993 enlargement of °uctuation bands.
23Even though impulse responses are not a valid model selection criteria, because
they are determined by the chosen methodological framework in which a model is
built (i.e. the imposed identifying restrictions, its speci¯cation and its estimation
method), they are widely used in the empirical literature because they easily con-
vey the message and provide a simple graphical assessment of the di®erences in the
trasmission mechanism.
24Industrial production is preferred to output in the empirical literature, and the
e®ects of a monetary shocks are more visible; however here we report the impulse
responseof output for consistency with our theoretical model where we have con-
sumption and assets rather than production. Cf. Simms, 1992; Mojon, 1997 amongst
others for discussion on the use of industrial production and Gennari and Giovannetti,
1998, for VAR using the same data set and methodology but industrial production
instead of output.
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(CPI are not adjusted) and some country dummy (for further details, see
Appendix and Gennari and Giovannetti, 1998).
Graph 6 and 7 show the impulse responses to a standardized mone-
tary shock together with 95% confldence intervals. In Germany (output)
bottoms out about ten quarters after the contractionary shock, and a
similar pattern is observed in France. The numerical efiect, however, is
higher in France (around -0.004 against -0.002) than in Germany25. This
implies that Germany is partially protected from a monetary tighten-
ing (at the same time it beneflt less from a monetary expansion), with
consequences on the preferences for monetary policy.
These results are very stable in the case of France. Difierent mea-
sures of interest rates (Pibor, Tbill rate), difierent sample sizes, inclusion
of a dummy variable to account for the EMS crises, inclusion of import
prices to deal with the price puzzle did not change the response of out-
put in any dimension (shape, numerical size, lags) while impacting on
the price response to an interest rate shock26.
As for Germany, however, the results seem to be more sensitive
to the sample size, most likely because German Uniflcation represents a
change in regime which is di–cult to account for when the more recent
period has a higher weight27. Interesting enough, when a shorter sample
25If industrial production is used instead of output, the numerical values are respec-
tively -0.008 for France and -0.005 for Germany, so the results are con¯rmed. When
using the output data a step dummy and an impulse dummy have to be included for
Germany in order to account for the break in the series due to German Uni¯cation.
26As most of the empirical studies we have reviewed, we found weak evidence of
a price puzzle, i.e. a perverse response of prices. The inclusion of import prices in
the VAR reduces the positive response of prices to a monetary contraction, without
eliminating it completely. Clarida and Gertler (1996) provide two explanations for
the price puzzle: either the magnitude of an interest rate rise which represents a
policy shock is not strong enough to have a decreasing impact on in°ation, or there
is an identi¯cation problem in the sense that the Central Banks have additional news
about in°ation which are not captured by the model.
27We replicated our exercise with the data set kindly provided by Ramaswamy
and Sloeck, 1997. Again, the output response of Germany changes with di®erent
sample sizes while that of France is very stable. In particular the standard errors for
Germany become very large on a shorter sample. The price response, not reported in
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size is selected (e.g. 1983-97), the efiect of the shock on German output
is substantially weaker (not difierent from zero) and the standard errors
much larger.
The efiects of the shock are transitory in both countries but seem
to be slightly more persistent in France (as in the computed responses
from our model). Overall, the estimated impulse response for France and
Germany have a shape very similar to the theoretical response calculated
from our model: the efiect of a monetary shock in the current situation
is difierent in the two countries and has a bigger impact in France where
agents are more illiquid. The asymmetry can have important conse-
quences for the behavior of the European Central Bank, at least up to
when(if) the flnancial structures in Europe will converge.
6 Conclusions
The focus of the debate on Monetary union has been so far mainly on
"real convergence". Real convergence is very important to achieve con-
sensus on harmonization of policies in a MU. However, difierences in
the flnancial structure can be crucial to achieve consensus on the -by
deflnition- harmonized monetary policy in EMU. Cross-country efiects
of a common monetary policy can be difierent as a result of difierences
in flnancial structures and in the transmission channels of monetary pol-
icy. While these issues are often discussed, they had not been appropri-
ately modeled and quantifled. This paper is novel in these regards. First
describes the underlying difierences across the main EMU countries, sec-
ond provides a theoretical model accounting for these difierences, where
is possible to study the efiects of an unexpected monetary shock, and,
third, provides new estimates of the efiects of a monetary shock in France
and Germany. Such estimates are consistent with the predictions of the
theoretical model.
Our work suggests that there are possibilities of con°icts over mon-
etary policy, at least in the early stages of EMU, even if countries’ rep-
their study, seems to be much worst.
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resentatives in the ECB share the same principles over monetary pol-
icy and there are no cyclical difierences across countries. It is to be
expected, however, that flnancial sectors will be progressively less seg-
mented, which, according to our theory, will result in more homogeneous
efiects. The European experience, since 1992, and the US experience,
shows, however, that such convergence may be slow. This can be im-
portant for the EMU since policy consensus will be crucial in its flrst
stage.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Structure of Financial markets, 1996
Market capitalization Trading volume
FIR BIR (% GDP) % GDP
France 42.4 73.8 38.9 63.5
Germany 52.8 80.2 29.6 33.3
Italy 39.9 70.3 21.7 8.6
UK na na 149.9 66.1
EU na na 53.0 38.5
Source: Bundesbank, Monthly Report, January 1997 and European Economy,
Supplement A, Economic Trends, n.12, December 1997. FIR stands for Financial In-
termediation Rate and is Financial assets of FI% total assets; BIR stands for Banking
Intermediation Rate and is Fin. assets of Banks%of Fin. Assets of Fin. sector.
Table 2: Financial assets of Households
(as proportion of gross flnancial assets)
1980 1994
Banks bonds equities inst.inv. Banks bonds equities inst. inv.
France .59 .09 .14 .07 .32 .04 .32 .29
Germany .59 .12 .04 .17 .45 .14 .06 .28
Italy .58 .08 .1 .06 .29 .2 .24 .09
UK .43 .07 .12 .3 .26 .01 .12 .54
Source: Davis, 1996.
Table 3: Corporate sector balance sheets, 1980 and 1994
(as proportion of gross flnancial assets)
1980 1994
bonds equit. loans. bonds equit. loans.
France 0.4 .34 .28 .03 .70 .28
Germany .02 .2 .52 .08 .25 .50
Italy .04 .52 .43 .03 .46 .44
UK .02 .37 .22 .001 .65 .12
Source: Davis, 1996 and OECD, Financial Statistics, various issues;
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Table 4: Ownership of listed shares by sector,1995
Households Non ¯n. corp. Public tot non-¯n sector Fin. Inst. Foreign
France 19.4 58.0 3.4 80.8 8.0 11.2
Germany 14.6 42.1 4.3 61.0 30.3 8.7
Italy 17 32 28 77 19 5
UK 29.6 4.1 0.2 33.9 52.4 13.7
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report, January 1997 and OECD Fi-
nancial Markets Trends, November 1995.
Table 5: Monetary Aggregates, 1995
France Germany Italy UK
cash/M1 9.1 29.1 15.9 4.7
cash/M2 7.8 18.9 8.1 na
cash/M3 4.7 11.8 na na
Per capita currency holding (US $) 850 1983 1066 575
Sources: Banque de France, Banca d'Italia and Deutsche BundesBank, annual
reports and OECD Financial Statistics.
Table 6: Parameters of the simulations
!0 !1 fl ° R µ1 µ2 µ3 R¡ µ
Country A 8 6 .996 0.78 1.05 .018 .01 .012 1.046
Country B 8 6 .996 .189 1.05 .02. .005 .005 1.06
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Table 7:Unit root tests
a) France
test statistic test statistic
in° rate
lev
logs
ADF(1)
ADF(1)
-1.521
-2.788
¢lev
¢logs
ADF(1)
DF
-4.806**
-3.968*
gdp
lev
logs
ADF(4)
ADF(2)
-2.572
-2.18
¢lev
¢logs
ADF(3)
ADF(1)
-3.45*
-4.493**
import
prices
lev
logs
ADF(1)
ADF(1)
-2.705
-2.628
¢lev
¢logs
DF
DF
-5.249**
-5.646**
ind.
prod
lev
logs
ADF(2)
ADF(2)
-2.392
-2.385
¢lev
¢logs
ADF(1)
ADF(1)
-4.178**
-4.285**
call m rate lev ADF(5) -4.512** ¢lev ADF(5) -3.651**
int.rate
3mth T.Bills
levels ADF(1) -3.081 ¢levels DF -6.651**
PIBOR
3 months
levels ADF(1) -3.073 ¢levels DF -6.981**
b) Germany
test statistic test statistic
gdp
lev
logs
ADF(1)
ADF(4)
-2.116
-2.278
¢lev
¢logs
DF
ADF(3)
-8.248**
-3.01*
in° rate (cpi)
lev
logs
ADF(1)
ADF(4).
-1.521
-3.54*
¢lev
¢logs
ADF(1)
DF
{9.171**
-4.46**
import
prices
lev
logs
ADF(1)
ADF(1)
-3.25
-3.55*
¢lev
¢logs
DF
DF
-4.21**
-4.18**
w. mkt p.
(raw mat).
lev
logs
ADF(3)
ADF(3)
-3.49*
-3.66*
¢lev
¢logs
ADF(2)
ADF(2)
-3.17*
-3.25*
call m rate lev ADF(5) -2.077 ¢lev ADF(4) -5.97**
LT int.rate
(7-15 y)
lev ADF(3) -2.32 ¢lev ADF(2) -3.51*
* signiflcance at 5%, ** signiflcance at 1%
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Appendix I:Data Sources
Data are obtained from IFS and Analytical Database of the OECD.
The period used is 1973 flrst quarter, 1997 fourth quarter. Output is in
logs and is seasonally adjusted. The series on real GDP is deflned in
national currency and is obtained from the OECD database (GDPVol).
The series on consumer price index is obtained by IFS (n. 64 for each
nation). The nominal interest rate is the call money rate and is also
from IFS. We also used industrial production from OECD database, UN
commodity price index (IFS), DM- dollar exchange rate series (IFS),
French franc- DM exchange rate series (IFS). For Germany a step dummy
for GEMU was used (0-1) and an impulse dummy for changes in the mean
in 1991. For France a dummy accounting for the oil crisis and the ERM
crises.
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